Labor mobility and antitakeover provisions

How do firms protect their human capital? We test whether firms facing an increased threat of being acquired strengthen their antitakeover provisions (ATPs) in order to bond with their employees. We use the adoption of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine (IDD) by US state courts, which exogenously decreases knowledge-worker mobility, thus elevating takeover risk and reducing employee incentives to innovate. Firms respond to the IDD adoption by strengthening ATPs that defend against hostile takeovers, especially when they have greater ex-ante employee mobility and human capital and place greater importance on employee relations. We find no evidence that managers strengthen ATPs for entrenchment or takeover bargaining purposes in this setting. Our findings show that ATPs can be used to credibly commit to employees in order to protect long-term value creation.     

内隐攻击性的研究方法综述

内隐攻击性研究沿袭了内隐社会认知的研究范式,主要采取内隐联想测验、投射测验、任务分离、启动技术、The GO/No-go联想测验方法、ERP技术、眼动技术等间接的测量方法。内隐攻击性的研究已被纳入内隐社会认知的范畴,研究方法多且难以统一,有待进一步探讨和管理。     

团队从失败中学习的激活机制：团队过程视角下领导印象管理策略的作用及其多重边界条件

团队从失败中学习是企业员工反思的关键要素,也是提升团队绩效的重要途径。领导在促进团队从失败中学习的过程中发挥着重要作用,然而现有文献鲜少关注促使领导者采取不同行为的深层原因。本文基于内隐领导理论探究领导印象管理与团队从失败中学习之间的关系,考察团队绩效和团队效能的双调节作用,构建被中介的调节效应模型。通过对某保险服务业集团的134个电话销售团队的1423名在职员工进行两阶段问卷调查,结果表明：领导印象管理正向影响团队从失败中学习;团队绩效和团队效能在领导印象管理与团队从失败中学习之间的关系中分别起到了负向调节作用;团队效能中介了团队绩效对领导印象管理与团队从失败中学习间关系的调节作用,表现出被中介的调节效应。本文一定程度上丰富了领导印象管理和团队从失败中学习的边界条件,为解释领导印象管理的效果提供了一个新的理论框架。     

中国银行业的系统性风险研究——从隐性担保到优胜劣汰

文章通过构建一个同时涵盖银行间同业拆借市场与回购市场的矩阵法模型,对2006-2014年我国银行业系统性风险进行研究,主要考虑隐性担保与优胜劣汰机制对系统性风险的影响。研究发现,总体上我国银行业系统性风险在近年来稳定在低位,从隐性担保转变到优胜劣汰并不会大幅提高我国银行业的系统性风险水平,优胜劣汰机制有可能增强市场纪律性,从而降低其系统性风险。     

湖南发展县域农村文化产业的问题和对策

经过近几年的努力,湖南农村文化消费条件改善,广大的农村市场文化消费水平将提高,文化产业已初具规模,本文通过总结湖南县域文化产业发展的基本经验,剖析了县域文化产业发展存在的主要问题,据此提出湖南县域文化产业发展的主要对策,为各级政府指导县域文化产业的发展提供参考依据。     

中国人民银行资产负债结构的经济学分析

中国人民银行资产负债表反映了我国的货币政策操作,与发达国家中央银行高政府债权比例和高通货比例的情形完全相反,高外汇资产比例与低通货比例是它的突出特征。从货币政策作用于宏观经济的收益成本来看,人行资产负债结构的变迁具有合理性。但是,货币发行以"外汇资产——人民币"为主的模式降低了人民币的信用价值。不合理的资产负债结构揭示了我国金融运行中的潜藏风险。文章提出了改善人民银行资产负债结构的有益思路。     

Issue Networks, Value Structures and the Formulation of Accounting Standards: An Exercise in Theory Building

This study is an exercise in theory building. It begins from the premise that current theory with respect to the setting of accounting standards is inadequate. We advance current theory by incorporating new ideas from sociology (issues network theory, see Heclo (1978, In: King A (ed) The New American Political System. American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC, pp 87–124) and social psychology (values structure ideas drawn from Shakun (1988, Evolutionary system design: policy making under complexity and group decision support systems. Holden-Day, Inc., Oakland, CA). In doing so, we extend previous theorizing on the accounting standard setting process (e.g., triocracy theory). Issue network theory holds that groups with intellectual, ideological and economic interests have interests in, and may exert efforts to influence, policy adoption. It is a natural outgrowth of, and important extension to, triocracy theory. We draw on Shakun’s (1988, Evolutionary system design: policy making under complexity and group decision support systems. Holden-Day, Inc., Oakland, CA) Evolutionary Systems Design theory to elucidate a theory of motivation. We argue that complex motivational structures influence the behaviors of the parties to the accounting standard setting process. As part of this effort, we categorize the guiding terminal values, instrumental values and operational goals that guide participant behaviors. We draw on previous literature to document parts of the model.     

领导会视谁为圈内人?内隐追随与领导-成员交换关系研究

基于内隐追随-外显追随匹配视角,探讨中心化追随者原型和理想化追随者原型对领导者感知的领导-成员交换(L-LMX)影响以及工作要求的调节作用。通过问卷调查对一个157人的样本进行多时段施测,结果发现,内隐追随可分为中心化追随者原型和理想化追随者原型。相较于中心化追随者原型与外显追随的匹配,理想化追随者原型与外显追随的匹配同L-LMX之间的关系更为密切。领导者工作要求负向调节两种原型的作用效果。     

法律环境、政府管制与隐性契约

本文从我国法律环境薄弱的转型制度环境出发,将管制视为法律机制欠缺的衍生机制,从理论上分析了管制权力可能外溢,构成隐性契约。以我国IPO遴选管制权为例,本文认为,证券管制机构在各地区间分配IPO资源时,会考虑各地区上市公司发生丑闻的频率和严重程度。证券管制机构的这一做法,并无明文规定,属于管制权力的外溢效应,这是一种无形的游戏规则,事实上形成了隐性契约。地方政府出于自身理性,会做出履行与否以及履行多少的对策。上述分析得到经验证据的支持。本文为理解转型经济中的政府管制作用、契约形式和投资者保护提供了新的发现和证据。     

Implicit contracting with a (potentially) reliable agent

Implicit contracts—informal agreements tied to observable, but non-verifiable information—play an important role in economic life. In this paper, we model such contracting in a two-period model with an agent that may be reliable, i.e., that always sticks to a promise he has previously made. We derive three main results: First, we show that a decrease in the discount factor may lead to a switch from a pooling equilibrium, where unreliable types mimic the reliable ones, to a separating one. Second, we find that a pooling equilibrium may yield a relatively lower surplus, because it puts a downward pressure on the effort that can be implemented. Combining both these results, we finally show that a decrease in the discount factor may be welfare-enhancing.